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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDONESIA'S DOCTRINE
FOR SPECIAL HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATIONS**

by

Amrul Adriansyah
Edy Suntoro

December 2015

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Douglas Borer
Robert Burks

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**THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDONESIA'S DOCTRINE FOR SPECIAL
HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATIONS**

Amrul Adriansyah
Major, Indonesian Navy
S.E, Sriwijaya University, 1996

Edy Suntoro
Lieutenant Commander, Indonesian Navy
S.T., Indonesian Naval College of Science and Technology, 2011

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2015**

Approved by: Douglas Borer
Thesis Advisor

Roberts Burks
Second Reader

John Arquilla
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

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ABSTRACT

This thesis offers guidance for hostage-rescue operations by the Indonesian Armed Forces Special Forces. It analyzes three hostage situation case studies: two involving the United States and one involving Indonesia. These case studies are analyzed using the principles of special operations applicable to a rescue operation. These principles, derived from the theory of special operations, are simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, purpose, operators' skills, and deception. Along with the theory of special operations, several guiding principles are also considered to both enhance the analysis and upgrade Indonesian doctrine for these particular rescue operations. These guiding principles are drawn from U.S. doctrine regarding military development in countries around the globe. Both the current Indonesian doctrine and manual need to be adjusted to reflect the dynamics of the current shifting nature of threats. A sound and systematic doctrine offering applicable guidance maximizes the chances of a successful operation. Furthermore, this thesis highlights the distinct phases and characteristics within a special operation. It provides a thorough understanding of the need for clear Indonesian doctrine and guidance for operators and planners in preparing a special rescue operation.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AO	Area of Operation
CO	Commanding Officer
CQB	Close Quarter Battle
DDG-96	Guided Missile Destroyer
FFG-40	Guided Missile Frigate
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commander
HQ	Headquarter
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JP	Joint Publication
Kemhan	Kementerian Pertahanan (Ministry of Defense)
Kemlu	Kementerian Luar Negeri (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
LHD-4	Landing Helicopter Dock - 4
Mabes	Markas Besar (Indonesian National Armed Forces Headquarter)
MOOTW	Military Operation Other Than War
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MV	Motor Vessel
NEO	Non Evacuation Operation
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
RM	Risk Management
RAND	Research and Development
ROE	Rule of Engagement
SLOT	Sea Lane of Trade
SOF	Special Operation Force
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
Spec Ops	Special Operations
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces)
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
WLG	Washington Liaison Group

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND ON RESCUE OPERATIONS

Indonesian citizens residing abroad may be affected by internal and external issues within the country where they live or work. Internal problems may arise due to the behavior of Indonesians themselves, while external problems may arise due to existing circumstances in the country where Indonesians are located. One such incident happened in Somalia with the Indonesian cargo ship Motor Vessel (MV) *Sinar Kudus*, which was carrying a load of Ferronickel. On March 16, 2011, during its journey from Kolaka (Celebes, Indonesia) to Rotterdam (Netherlands) the ship was hijacked by Somali Pirates.

The capture of the MV *Sinar Kudus* sparked a debate within Indonesia. The Preamble of the Indonesian 1945 Constitution contains the phrase, “protect all the people and the entire country of Indonesia, promote the general welfare, the intellectual life of the nation, and participate in the establishment of world order based on freedom, lasting peace, and social justice.”¹ The phrase “protect all the people” obligates the government and relevant agencies to protect Indonesian citizens wherever they are in the world. In order to deal with these types of problems, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), as the main national strength, is assigned the mission to protect Indonesian citizens overseas. In addition, Indonesian Regulation No. 34, 2014 mandates that the TNI: “protect all the people” and deems necessary the formation of a unified task organization of the TNI and related agencies in order for TNI to possess the ability to execute an evacuation or a rescue operation successfully.² Therefore, this thesis examines the necessity for Indonesia to establish such a new organization. This task normally falls to the Special Forces within the Indonesian Armed Forces. However, Indonesian Special Forces from the three services are not well prepared to handle extra-territorial rescue operations since there is no manual for this particular mission.

¹ Undang-undang Dasar Tahun 1945 [Indonesian Constitution 1945].

² *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* [Indonesian National Armed Forces] (*Undang-undang*) [Indonesian law], No. 34, (2001).

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

What critical conditions and factors are necessary to maximize the success of a rescue operation?

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Joint Publication 3-68 about *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, sets forth a joint doctrine identifying the activities and performances of the U.S. Armed Forces necessary to conducting such operations. There are four phases for conducting successful Noncombatant Evacuation Operations:

1. Preparatory operation. In this phase, the NEO task force is activated to carry out necessary intelligence gathering, logistical preparation, exercises, and the completion of other administrative activities.
2. Preliminary operation. In this stage, the elements within the NEO task force, and particularly the implementation team, are shifted to the staging area to carry out the planning and set up a command center that requires evacuation. Operating in locations where the task force may encounter armed force necessitates military operation preparatory actions
3. Evacuation operation. This phase is the most important in the overall operation. In this phase, the NEO task force will carry out the tactical deployment of the evacuation process, to include securing both vital areas and the point of embarkation, and providing security forces to secure the evacuation process
4. Withdrawal and Redeployment. This stage is the final stage of the overall NEO operation. Implementation of the evacuation task is complete when all the citizens are safe.³

These principles are included in the analyses of the three cases included in this thesis and are utilized in the development of an exemplary model for Indonesian rescue operations, in particular extra-territorial operations that include both foreign and government officials.

In U.S. Army *Doctrine Preference about the Operations Process*, the “Army’s framework for exercising a mission is the operations process – the major mission

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* (JP 3-68) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), II-14.

command activities performed during operations, to include planning, executing, and continuously accessing the operation.” Assessment is needed throughout the process, from the beginning of planning, and preparation, to the implementation of the operation itself. The major mission command activities are defined as follows:

1. Planning. Interpret the situation and determine how to work effectively.
2. Preparing. It involves preparations made to get the troops ready for impending operation.
3. Executing. Implement combat skills to complete the task.
4. Assessing. Complete a given task, create the desired effect or achieve a predetermined goal.⁴

TNI’s guide on joint operations, explained that the implementation of joint operations is conducted in three stages: planning, execution, and termination. These stages are defined as follow:

1. Planning. It is done through a process by a combined staff.
2. Executing. Preparation of operation and execution of the operation.
3. Termination. Tactical and administrative measures such as consolidation, reporting on the implementation of tasks, resume tasks or withdraw on orders.⁵

In this thesis, these stages are compared and merged with the previously cited doctrines from the U.S. manuals.

According to William H. McRaven, in his book *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory & Practice*, there are six principles of Special Operation that have to be followed and if one of them is overlooked, disregarded, or bypassed, inevitably the mission is jeopardized. The six principles of Special Operations are simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose. These principles provide the basic framework for the analysis of the three cases included in this thesis.

⁴ Department of the Army, *The Operations Process* (FM 5-0) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), iv.

⁵ Indonesian National Armed Forces, *TNI’s Guide on Joint Operations* (Jakarta: Indonesian National Armed Forces, 2003), Appendix I.

Edward S. Devlin in his book *Crisis Management Planning and Execution* mentioned that, when a crisis reaches its highest stage, the management team should use the “following steps: take charge quickly, determine the facts, tell your story, and fix the problem.”⁶ If these steps are followed, then the organization will be in control in the crisis. These steps should also be included in the proposed tactical handbook for an Indonesian group leader and commander of the rescue operation while conducting a mission, especially under critical conditions that demand rapid decision-making based on the situational and conditional assessment.

An article by Jennifer Morrison Taw with Marcy Agmon and Lois M. Davis published by RAND, entitled “Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War,” talks about lacking capability of both sides.⁷ It also provides recommendations such as giving the soldiers as well as the civilian’s knowledge of either side’s capabilities, in order to ensure the effective coordination and cooperation during an operation, and overcoming the organizational differences between the Military and the civilians.⁸

An interesting thesis written by former Naval Postgraduate School student Jerry J. Kung, about using non-lethal weapons in Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, addresses the possibility that using non-lethal weapons would mitigate the risks of escalation in the threat level because the mission itself could be jeopardized, even though non-lethal weapons have no role in the NEOs. Kung also explained how the challenge of NEOs is to control the crowd through the use non-lethal weapons, due to the potential for violence. However, the differences between the U.S. and Indonesia in capability, military and civilian assets are significant. Nevertheless, Kung’s ideas could be used in the search for the right solution for Indonesia.

⁶ Edward S. Devlin, *Crisis Management Planning and Execution*, (New York: Auerbach Publications, 2007), 2.

⁷ Jennifer Morrison Taw, Marcy Agmon, and Lois M. Davis. “Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War.” *RAND Institute*. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR825.pdf

⁸ Ibid.

D. METHODOLOGY

To evaluate the conditions which may lead to the success or failure of a rescue operation, this thesis examines in depth three different case studies of rescue operations conducted overseas by different armed forces of the world. Two of these operations were conducted successfully, and one was unsuccessful. The first case is the attempted 2011 rescue of American citizens in Somalia, at the end of which the rescuers discovered the pirates had already killed the American yachters. The second case involves the rescue operation conducted successfully by Indonesian forces of the Indonesian MV *Sinar Kudus*, which was taken hostage by Somali pirates. The third case is the 2009 rescue operation of Capt. Richards Phillips.

These cases were selected in order to compare the differences in techniques and quantum of force utilization in addition to planning, preparation, rehearsals, and both the assault and post assault phases of the operation.

This thesis analyzes the above cases by applying the principles from the aforementioned references in order to peel away the elements within each case and comprehend the principles involved. At the end of this thesis, the authors propose a contemporary doctrine, drawn from the above references, that is applicable to the current strategic and operational requirements.

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II. RESCUE OPERATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

In understanding the essence of special operations tasked with the distinct goal of the rescue mission, one should first comprehend the definition and elements of a rescue operation. A successful rescue mission only results from the deliberate planning and application of all aspects and elements of the operation. In Field Manual 90-29, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* (NEOs) are defined as operations “to evacuate civilian noncombatants and nonessential military personnel from locations in a foreign (host) nation during time of endangerment to a designated safehaven.”⁹ A NEO is “characterized by uncertainty and may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country’s government”¹⁰ that could include the reorientation of diplomatic and military relationships within one’s own country, a sudden hostile threat to the citizen of one’s own country “from a force within or external to a hostile nation, or a devastating natural or man-made disaster.”¹¹ Furthermore, NEO operations have widespread implications in humanitarian, military, economic, diplomatic and political arenas. Therefore, NEOs involve the swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation, and a well-planned withdrawal of the force along with the evacuees at the end of the operation.¹² The specific characteristics in the environment make NEO operations distinct from other military operations. In JP 3-68, the highest authority on the evacuation operation is positioned within the authority of the ambassador in the host nation, instead of the geographic combatant commander (GCC) or the subordinate joint force commander (JFC).¹³ NEO operations can be conducted within several distinct environments, which may be sub-divided into three types. In the first, a permissive environment exists wherein

⁹ Department of the Army, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* (FM 90-29) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994), I-1.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* (JP 3-68) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), I-3.

¹² Ibid., ix.

¹³ Ibid.

the operation is conducted with the accord of the host nation. In this environment, there is no resistance to the planned NEO. Therefore, there could be some form of support provided by the host nation. In the second, an uncertain environment exists, one without a distinct form of governance or control by the host nation. The host nation's forces may be in support of, or in opposition to, the NEO operations. In the third, a hostile environment exists that could take the form of civil disorder, terrorist action, or full-scale combat. In this environment, one's own forces are expected to encounter heavy resistance from any forces in the host nation. However, this thesis will examine those operations that take the place in the open seas, where no positive law of any nation is in effect. Therefore, the command and control of the NEO comes directly from the combatant commander or the on-site commander/ task-force commander.

William McRaven states that in order to achieve a successful special operations mission, one should use certain principles so that the friendly force can achieve relative superiority toward the enemy.¹⁴ Furthermore, McRaven mentions that typically the attacking force is relatively smaller in size than the defensive force at the target. For that particular reason, the phases of special operation begin with the preparation phase, progress to the assault phase, and end with the post assault phase. Each phase should be carefully executed in order to gain the intended result for the mission. Therefore, this chapter explains the operational phases of special operations, so as to provide guidance in the preparation of special rescue operations.

Gazit¹⁵ mentions that special rescue operations have the ideal goals of

- Rescuing the hostages alive and well.
- Conducting the operation with minimum or no collateral damage or casualties.
- Limiting casualties, if there should be any, to the perpetrators or terrorists.

¹⁴ William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operation Warfare: Theory & Practice*, (New York: The random House Publishing Group, 1996), 11.

¹⁵ Shlomo Gazit, "Risk, Glory, and Rescue Operation in the International Security," *International Security* 6, no. 1 (Summer 1981): 112, doi: 10.2307/2538532.

- Assuring there are no further political or military ramifications that could affect wider aspects than the hostage rescue operation.

These goals should become the principal guidelines in planning a rescue operation, since they can be the standard by which to measure the result of any such operation. Ideally these goals would set a high standard in the planning of an operation, and all efforts would then be focused on achieving them and gaining the best end results. However, the dynamics of the situation on the ground can affect the end goals. For that particular aspect, the flexibility and innovation of skilled operators is required in accomplishing the mission's goals. This chapter discusses these aspects of the rescue operation in further details.

As per the Indonesian Constitution no. 34 year 2004 on Indonesian Armed Forces, the special rescue mission operation falls under the realm of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).¹⁶ Within the scope of the constitution, Indonesian forces are able to conduct the necessary operations to address the emergence of the threats menacing the sovereignty of Indonesia and undermining the national security interests. However, the operational guidance of such operations, and in particular the rescue mission operation, is still undeveloped to the level that all essential elements are not yet correlated in the operational structure of a rescue mission's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement (ROEs). Nevertheless, any operation should be planned and based on the principles and elements of special rescue operations conducted by other armed forces, such as the U.S. forces.

B. PRINCIPLES OF THE SPECIAL RESCUE OPERATION

In exploring the possibilities of conducting a rescue operation, William McRaven explains that not all of the supporting personnel are special operators. However, they are trained, equipped, and supported relative to the specific goal within the mission.¹⁷ Therefore, the basic principles of a special operation should not be limited to only special

¹⁶ *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* [Indonesian National Armed Forces] (*Undang-undang*) [Indonesian Law], No. 34, (2001).

¹⁷ William H. McRaven, "The Theory of Special Operations" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993).

operations personnel; hence, the involvement of non-special units should be considered. As long as the involved units can communicate, cooperate, and function together as one unit during the mission, it is not necessary to have only special operators conducting the mission.

This thesis tailors McRaven's six principles of special operations,¹⁸ to the needs of the Indonesian Armed Forces while conducting special rescue operations. Those principles include the following:

1. Simplicity

The imperative challenge of a special operation is to make the plan sufficiently simple that it can be understood and executed by everyone. According to McRaven, the three critical elements of simplicity are a limited number of objectives, good intelligence, and innovation. Simplicity is critical for the success of any rescue operation. From the perspective of a rescue mission, the focused objective has to be designated early in the planning phase to avoid confusion. Good intelligence is essential and might be the decisive factor influencing the success of the whole mission. Innovation should be considered in expanding the means by which the alternate methods are employed to achieve the mission's goals.¹⁹

2. Security

It is imperative to keep information about the operation secure and not to allow the enemy to gain any intelligence through other means. It is paramount to keep the planned movement of the operation as secure as possible. However, it is also important to bear in mind that an adversary will prepare itself for an incoming attack in order to disrupt the rescuers' goals. In the context of a rescue mission, information security of the mission should be heavily guarded in order to avoid any information leak that could compromise the mission. Any faux pas of the information security would not only jeopardize the mission, but may result in collateral damage.²⁰

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operation Warfare: Theory & Practice*, (New York: The random House Publishing Group, 1996), 11.

²⁰ Ibid., 14.

3. Repetition/Rehearsal

Repetition instills in the personnel involved in the mission a “muscle memory” of what each individual must do during the mission. McRaven considers this principle indispensable in providing a greater chance of mission success. This principle has a general application in any domain. Repetition will bring perfection to any plan while at the same time reducing the possibility of mission failure.²¹

4. Surprise

The element of surprise may be the one critical factor that contributes to the victory and success of a mission. Therefore, a good plan should always include the element of surprise as one of the advantages that should be maintained during the execution of the mission. McRaven emphasizes this aspect while mentioning that the enemy will also prepare itself in anticipation of a surprise attack. In the framework of a rescue mission, surprise might be considered heavily in the circumstances where the hostages are safe and no collateral damage may result. However, in the special occasion of a hostage threatened, the element of surprise could only inflict further damage; it is then the responsibility and judgment of the operator to decide whether the element of surprise will still prove advantageous to the goal of the mission.²²

5. Speed

The principle of speed is applicable to any military operation despite the nature of the mission. McRaven emphasizes the use of speed to avoid expanding of the area of vulnerability.²³

6. Purpose

The purpose of the mission should be understood by everyone involved in the operation before executing the mission. A well-defined purpose of the mission is vital for

²¹ Ibid., 15.

²² Ibid., 16.

²³ Ibid., 19.

the whole operation. In a rescue operation, the purpose of the rescue mission could be described in one word, rescue.²⁴

McRaven's six principles are considered the basic principles of all special operations. McRaven perceives them as essential to gain an advantage over the mission situation by conducting simple planning that is concealed (security) and rehearsed repeatedly and realistically. The execution should include the element of surprise with speed and purpose in order to achieve the main task and reach the goals.

In addition to the previous six principles, Carlos Perez in his Master's thesis²⁵ describes four main principles of a hostage rescue operation that are similar to McRaven's. The principles are,

1. Intelligence

Perez mentions that intelligence, based on the Joint Pub 1-02, 2003, 261), is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. It is information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. Similar to McRaven, Perez perceives the use of good intelligence information in a rescue operation as vital to knowing the situation and the updated condition of the target mission area, including the hostile and friendly factors on the ground. Moreover, the requirement of intelligence for a hostage rescue mission is very specific and often very different, relative to the surrounding environment. Therefore, in order to obtain such information, the technical and human intelligence assets should be able to provide the requested information regarding the dynamic change of the mission area. For the U.S. armed forces, hi-tech equipment in conjunction with human assets supports the technical assets' capability to gain intelligence information. In the case of Indonesia, the armed forces do not enjoy such hi-tech luxury in their efforts to gather

²⁴ Ibid., 21.

²⁵ Carlos M. Perez, "Anatomy of a hostage rescue: What makes hostage rescue operations successful?" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014).

information; therefore, the optimization of human assets should be maximized in gathering intelligence information prior to conducting a military rescue mission.²⁶

2. Surprise

Perez explains that special operations forces should be able to achieve and maintain the element of surprise so that the adversary is unable to react effectively. Surprise requires bold, imaginative, and audacious action in order to execute a mission that requires surgical precision. Furthermore, citing from Bob Leonhard's, *The Principles of War for the Information Age*, Perez describes the two types of surprise, technical and tactical, and states both should be gained in order to have an advantage over the mission situation. He considers that the presence of an absolute surprise is vital to the successful execution of the mission plan. Moreover, the element of surprise is highly dependent on a good planning and the exploitation of intelligence on the enemy's weaknesses.²⁷

3. Operator's Skills

Special operations require special skills. Perez elaborates on this distinction by explaining that the "operator's skill" means that the personnel involved within a specific rescue mission should have the capability required to finish the mission successfully. This assumption aligns with McRaven's theory that a regular Special Operation Force (SOF) could not fulfill the demand of a hostage rescue operation. In McRaven's theory, the personnel must be trained repetitively to meet the high level demands of a specific rescue operation. Moreover, some operations may involve the Close Quarter Battle (CQB) capability. Therefore, the high demand of an operator's skills in a high-risk rescue operation should be fulfilled by repetitive yet realistic rehearsal.²⁸

4. Deception

Rescue operations require the secure entrance of the rescuer force without being compromised. In order to gain that advantage, a good deception plan should be employed at the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, negotiation could be used to prolong the advantage and keep the situation under control. At the operational level,

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

deception may be used to distract the enemy from seeing the incoming rescue mission, thereby giving the rescue party a breaching and entry point to execute the rescue mission.²⁹

This thesis acknowledges all of the aforementioned principles of a good rescue operation in developing the basic guidelines for an Indonesian Armed Forces rescue operation. However, eight principles, drawn from McRaven and Perez, form the framework for the analysis of each case below. Specifically, these principles are simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, purpose, operator's skills, and deception.

C. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESCUE OPERATIONS

Gazit outlines three characteristics that distinguish the nature of the rescue operation from the conventional military operation.³⁰

1. First, a rescue operation is the climax of a war that should be resolved by a specific military act. All efforts that encompass diplomatic, psychological, and military aspects are employed for the sake of the operation. The success of a rescue operation is also a matter of war-like victory or defeat for the country.³¹
2. Second, a rescue operation is the privilege of political leadership in making the call to deploy the mission. Therefore, the responsibility for the success of the operation will rest in the hands of the political authority. There are many aspects to the general picture of a rescue operation. The complexity of domestic and foreign pressures that mount around the necessity to conduct a special rescue operation can influence the decision and planning of the operation itself.³²
3. Third, the planning of a military rescue operation should heavily consider the political constraints resulting from a deteriorating situation since the leadership will bear all responsibilities for whatever way the operation ends. And political leadership considers that unfavorable outcome of

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Shlomo Gazit, "Risk, Glory, and Rescue Operation in the International Security," *International Security* 6, no. 1 (Summer 1981): 112, doi: 10.2307/2538532.

³¹ Ibid., 113-115.

³² Ibid.

rescue mission is not acceptable to them, they make call of the operation and look for alternate solutions.³³

Interestingly, Gazit argues that, similar to war in the Clausewitzian realm, rescue operations should be the last resort of an effort regarding the hostages and the necessity to rescue them. It is significant that the authority begin with negotiations without submitting to the demands of the terrorists.

D. THE PHASES OF RESCUE OPERATIONS

A rescue operation can be divided into three common phases³⁴ fundamental to the success of a mission. These phases relate to the previously discussed characteristics and principles of a rescue operation.

1. Phase I: Planning

In order to understand rescue operation planning, it is necessary to first understand how the planning processes of rescue operations and classical military operations differ. Gazit explains that rescue operations have four planning principles.³⁵

- (1) First, considering the nature of the threats, rescue operations often involve very dynamic, rapid changes to the situation. Therefore, it is necessary to consider bright, original, and even crazy ideas. The conventional military plan emphasizes the correct use of military assets. However, in a rescue mission, the use of “out of the box” concepts can ensure the element of surprise and expand the possibility of a successful mission with minimum casualties and collateral damage.³⁶
- (2) Second, it is important to save time in the mission preparation while waiting the political decision to be made. Time is crucial in a rescue operation; therefore, while the political authority weighs the non-technical aspects of the operation, the planners and operators should prepare themselves up until the moment leadership promulgates the decision.³⁷

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 125-128.

³⁵ Ibid., 120-121.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

- (3) Third, within the planning process, the involvement by the leadership is required in order to create a dialogue between planners and decision makers. This is important because effective and efficient planning that involves the authority eliminates bureaucratic delays. The establishment of such a dialogue will enhance understanding by both the planners and the political leaderships.³⁸
- (4) Fourth, besides the planners and the political leaderships, either the operators or the commander of the unit to be deployed for the mission should also be involved in the planning of the mission. Learning the capabilities of the operators from the personnel directly involved in executing the mission is important in determining the actual feasibility of the mission.³⁹

The planning process should consider executing the operation while the perpetrators are still unsure of the outcome of their actions. Therefore, timing is crucial in the planning of an operation. However, waiting is also an option for the rescue force, allowing the operators to prepare themselves to the point that they are ready and all supporting elements are on hand. There are, though, several disadvantages to waiting. In some cases, the hostages can develop a special relationship or feeling toward the perpetrators known as the Stockholm syndrome.⁴⁰ In addition, the situation can deteriorate while the tension and pressure directed toward the hostages can increase. Nevertheless, it is all depend on the overall situation. When the situation is under control, a longer wait will increase the possibility of success. On the contrary, when situation is out of control, timing becomes the ultimate determiner of the operation's success.

A good plan should always have a back-up plan in case during the operation the situation spirals out of control. Besides the main action plan, the rescue force should be equipped with a contingency and emergency plan for any possible scenario of the mission. Perez comes up with a valid rescue plan that comprises several prerequisites of the decision-making process.⁴¹ Few of the prerequisites of a sound rescue plan

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Carlos M. Perez, "Anatomy of a hostage rescue: What makes hostage rescue operations successful?" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014).

⁴¹ Ibid.

considered necessary by Perez are mentioned by Richard Yarger in his paper and which are :

- (1) The overall plan must be suitable. This means that the mission is in accordance with the political constraints mandated by the authority, and yet still accomplishable.⁴²
- (2) The plan must be feasible. The operators of the rescue mission can accomplish the mission within the time window given, with the support elements provided, and with the emerging constraints that may come along the way.⁴³
- (3) The plan should be acceptable. The advantage and the cost resulting from a particular course of action are still in balance. If possible, the advantage outweighs the cost and the risks.⁴⁴
- (4) The plan should be distinguishable. The course of actions given to the operators should be distinct from one to another. The avoidance of confusion is important so that operators on the ground will be able to identify a specific course of action and the possible outcomes of that option.
- (5) Finally, the plan should be complete. The overall plan must consist of the detail requirement of forces, deployment mode, support elements, time frame of the operation, the extraction plan, contingency plan, and aim of the mission.

2. Phase II: Approach and Assault

After a relatively long process of planning, the next phase of a rescue operation typically is the implementation phase. However, the implementation plan should be rehearsed and repeated in order for the operators to become accustomed to the required actions during the operation. Once the plan and preparation are finalized, the next phase involving the approach and assault may be executed. This phase is the decisive phase since it will decide the outcome of the rescue operation. It is important to remember that

⁴² H. Richard Yarger, "Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Vol. 1: Theory of War and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2010), 50.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

any movement by the force attempting the rescue should remain undetected by the adversary in order that the element of surprise and unanticipated action may increase the possibility of a successful mission.

Full coordination between the command control systems and the operators should be maintained at all times. This is so that all elements involved with the operation may be updated on the current situation. While the command control element is monitoring the progress of this phase, the operators should always be ready for any abrupt changes on the ground and be prepared to implement the contingency and emergency plan in case the mission is compromised. The unit leader is the one who is responsible for assessing the conditions at first sight and reporting them through the chain of command to the command and control system. Further assessment could be made in a timely fashion and forwarded to the operators, so they can execute the immediate decision in accordance with the developing situation. The communication and coordination function is crucial during the approach and assault phase.

During the assault, the hostages' safety is the priority of the rescue force. However, during the raid attack, the firing and explosions may surprise the hostage, who may become confused and not know how to react or what to do. The role of the rescue force is to firstly secure the hostage in a safe place to avoid any casualties. The possibility of having a terrorist disguised as one of the hostage could complicate the operation. This situation should be handled carefully; therefore, the operators should consider all personnel lacking proper identification within the perimeter of the mission dangerous until consultation with the support elements at command and control indicates otherwise.

3. Phase III: Postassault

Once phase II is finished, it does not mean that the operation is completed. If the hostages can be liberated, it is another task to safeguard them to a safe place in order for them to receive further treatments by the authorities. The operators might encounter hostages who demand something out of proportion, which could jeopardize the whole operation. Therefore, it is necessary for the rescue operators to be firm with the hostages for the safety of all. There is no room of tolerance within the critical situation of a rescue

mission. While securing the target area, the rescue force should deny any external intervention that could negate the entire phase. After the situation is deemed secure by the field unit commander, the extraction process may continue.

During the extraction, the supporting elements of the rescue force must maintain the highest alert for any developing situation that could potentially disrupt the extraction of the hostages. Furthermore, the status of each hostage must be confirmed before they are transported to a safe haven. This action is necessary in order to firmly control the situation. In the enemy's territory, the rescue force should act as the sole unit accommodating every emergency need of the hostages, in particular medical aid. However, in the friendly area, those responsibilities should fall to the designated agencies that involve the supporting elements.

The execution of a planned rescue operation requires an immense joint effort from all elements involved in the operation at all phases. Moreover, a clear accordance between those in command who are making the call and the operators on the ground should be established so that both elements comprehend the situation. Moreover, the decision to deploy a rescue operation acquires a bold decision from the political leaderships since the responsibilities of whatever outcome will rest on their shoulders.

To summarize, we can divide the rescue operation into three phases: planning, approach and assault, and post assault. After discussing the principles of special operations given by both McRaven and Perez, this thesis views operator's skill and repetition as similar principles. The principle of surprise is also found common for both the writers, so during the next chapter this thesis analyzes all the case studies under eight principles: intelligence, simplicity, purpose, repetition, security, speed, surprise and deception. Intelligence, simplicity, purpose and repetition occur during the planning phase (phase I). Speed and surprise are more relevant during the approach and assault phase (phase II). While deception can support the security of the information, it would definitely help to achieve surprise, so in this context both the principles of security and deception have to be incorporated across all phases.

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III. ANALYSIS OF CASES

“Special operations are operations conducted by specially organized, trained and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independent of, or in coordination with, operations of conventional, non special operations forces.” The Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Joint Pub 3–05).

William McRaven, in his book *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*, includes rescue missions in the category of special operation because special operators that are involved, and specific preparation prior to the operation is required for the mission to be successful.⁴⁵ There are four operations in McRaven’s book that resemble or constitute a rescue mission; Operation Oak: The Rescue of Benito Mussolini; The U.S. Ranger Raid in Cabanatuan; Operation Kingpin: The U.S. Army Raid on Son Tay; and Operation Jonathan: The Israeli Raid on Entebbe. Fundamentally, a rescue operation can be categorized as a special operation that is unconventional in the nature of its deployment and usage. The specific goals and mission determine the degree to which the mission differs from the conventional warfare in the use of forces and deployment of tactics and strategy. Special operations rescue missions are conducted from a disadvantaged position for the force conducting the operations. In McRaven’s term, the adversary has the advantage of place or fortified position.⁴⁶ In preparing to gain a relative superiority over the enemy, the offensive force must prepare itself very well.

In the effort to formulate the guidelines for rescue or hostage rescue operations by the Indonesian Special Operations forces, this thesis analyzes three specific cases involving special operations rescue missions. Two cases are drawn from the U.S. Special

⁴⁵ William H. McRaven, *Spec ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (New York: Presidio Press, 1996).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

Operations Forces experience, and one case is taken from the Indonesian Special Forces experience.

A. THE RESCUE OF CAPTAIN PHILLIPS

1. Chronology of the Story

a. Background:

The MV *Maersk Alabama* was in route to Mombasa, Kenya, after a short transit in Djibouti. The hijacking took place in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia, approximately 240 nautical miles Southeast of Eyl, Somalia. On April 8, 2009, the crew under the master of the ship, Captain Richard Phillips, identified a blip on the radar and later identified it as an inbound pirate's boat heading towards the ship. The crew fought to hinder the pirates from boarding the vessel. However, the pirates were able to board the ship. Following the prescribed anti-piracy drill, the crew disabled the ship's control mechanism denying the pirate's control. In the ensuing fight against the pirates, Captain Phillips and some of the crew were taken hostage. Meanwhile, the *Alabama's* remaining crew under Chief Engineer, Mike Perry, managed to capture the ringleader of the pirates, Abduwali Muse, after a struggle in the darkened engine room. Subsequently, the crew attempted to exchange the captured pirate for Captain Phillips. Unfortunately, the exchange did not go as planned. The pirates regained control of the situation and fled the ship using a lifeboat of the *Maersk Alabama* taking Captain Phillips as a hostage.⁴⁷

b. Phase I - Planning

The response to the hijacking involved the U.S. Navy ships, the United States Navy guided-missile destroyer USS *Bainbridge* (DDG-96), the guided-missile frigate USS *Halyburton* (FFG-40), and the amphibious assault ship the USS *Boxer* (LHD-4). The standoff began on April 9, 2009, one day after the ship was attacked. However, the containment of the locus on the lifeboat had minimized the area of operation. Yet, it also

⁴⁷Edmund Sanders and Julian E. Barnes, "Somalia Pirates Hold U.S. Captain," *New York Times*, April 09, 2009. <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/09/world/fg-somali-pirates9>

presented another level of difficulty: the life of the hostage was always under threat due to the close proximity with the pirates.

The effort concentrated on rescuing Captain Phillips from the pirates who remained in the lifeboat. The pirates' strategy was to take Captain Phillips to Somalia where any rescue attempt would be made more difficult. In the meantime, the pirates attempted to join their fellow pirates holding other vessels in captivity, so as to reinforce themselves while using their hostage as a human shield.

c. Phase II – Approach & Assault

After four days of standoff, Commander Frank Castellano the CO of the USS *Bainbridge*, with prior authorization from higher authority, deemed that Captain Phillips' life was in imminent danger and ordered snipers from SEAL Team Six to take their shots. The SEAL team managed to kill three of the pirates with headshots, while the fourth pirate, Abduwali Muse, was onboard the USS *Bainbridge*, having arrived with the initial intention of talking to elders from his village and negotiating the terms of Captain Phillips' release.

d. Phase III – Post Assault

Abduwali Muse was then captured and sent to America for trial where he was sentenced to 33 years in an American penitentiary. Captain Phillips was rescued without any injury.

2. Examined Special Operation aspects

In the subsequent paragraph, we will analyze the above operation in light of the eight principles noted earlier. We also discuss that how adherence and/or violation of these principles contributed to the success or failure of the operation.

a. Intelligence

The collection of intelligence data was made possible with the use of a UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), ScanEagle.⁴⁸ The use of the UAV was critical to providing pictorial information on the whole operation and the developing situation of the hostage rescue operation.

b. Simplicity

On the matter of simplicity, the effort took three Navy warship assets to ensure that the operation went well, although, some consider the deployment of three Navy ships an overwhelming response, one that made the effort less simple than it needed to be. Nevertheless, it was worth the effort. Moreover, the operation was a success due to the uniformity of the personnel involved, all of who shared similarities in tactics and operational doctrine. The deployment of a single branch in a rescue effort simplifies the chain of command and related structures during a mission.

c. Purpose

This operation to rescue Captain Phillips and his vessel, the MV *Maersk Alabama*, reflects the ideal goals mentioned by Gazit.⁴⁹ The hostages could be rescued; no collateral damage occurred and the only casualties were the pirates; no political or military ramifications resulted due to the nature of the pirates and the failing state of Somalia. Both are incapable of responding to any security breach on their ground, including the rising number of pirate acts within Somali's territorial waters.

d. Repetition

The rescue operation tested the expertise and skills of the personnel involved. The end result of the operation is proof of the skills of those individuals. Meanwhile, considering the scale of the rescue operation while the vessel had been secured and

⁴⁸ Bill Gortney, "Navy Versus Piracy," *All Hands Magazine*, April 12, 2009. http://www.navy.mil/ah_online/antipiracy/

⁴⁹ Shlomo Gazit, "Risk, Glory, and Rescue Operation in the International Security," *International Security* 6, no. 1 (Summer 1981): 112, doi: 10.2307/2538532.

guarded to the port of destination in Mombasa, vis-à-vis the pressure and rapid action needed to rescue the hostage in the lifeboat, carrying out of rehearsals was not a priority. However, this simplicity of plan and uniformity of rescue team compensated for this shortfall.

e. Security

The security of the operation was not crucial beyond standard measures (SOPs). Other than killing the hostages, which would have resulted in their own deaths, the adversary did not have any capability to use easily use information against the incoming rescue team. The pirates lacked any real capacity to use any information gained on the rescue operation to their benefit.

f. Surprise

The early arrival of the rescue force surprised the pirates and they were unable to move the hostage deep inside. The time gained here put the pirates into a force disadvantage. If surprise had been lost, the pirates might have called in for reinforcements or killed the hostage. For them, the initiative was lost.

g. Speed

The response was given promptly after a distress signal was transmitted by assets in the area. Planning and preparation was done without waste of any time and rescue team was deployed quickly. Therefore, rapid action and speed of response are more fundamental for the rescue operation. One lesson learned from this case is that both the speed of the operation and the rapid response of the rescue task force are essential to halting the further deteriorating situation of a hostage operation. One can only imagine how the situation might have worsened if the hostage had been taken inland deeper into the pirate's nest. The operators' skills, on the other hand, reflected the highest capability performance for any time-pressure occasion. Furthermore, because of the in time deployment of rescue team, a good and balance field assessment of the situation on the ground enabled the commander of the field to make the decision for prompt action when a life was at stake.

h. Deception

Regarding the principle of deception, the rescue operators used deception against the pirates by assuring them that the village elders were willing to talk to them through a phone onboard the USS *Bainbridge*. This strategy calmed the pirates down stopped them from acting aggressively toward the hostage. This too blunted their initiative.

During Phase I, the planning process of the operation, the principles of simplicity, security, and purpose are evident while the other principles do not appear to apply. In Phase II, the approach and assault, the principles of surprise, speed, operator's skills, and deception are present. In phase III, the post-assault, the extraction plan does not require any specific principles since the hostage is already saved and in a safe haven aboard the navy ship.

B. THE SY QUEST YACHT HIJACKING

1. Chronology of the Story

a. Background:

The *SY Quest* hijacking took place off the coast of Oman on February 18th, 2011.⁵⁰ Nineteen pirates on a mother ship boarded the yacht with four American citizens onboard. The Americans were on an around-the-world trip using an American-flagged yacht and the attack was the first piracy act against an American-flagged ship since the attack on the MV *Maersk Alabama* in 2009. Much of the following analysis is based on logic and interpretation of known facts and results of the mission. Note: most of the true data by U.S. forces remains unavailable to non-Americans.

b. Phase I – Planning

Time is crucial in any rescue operation; therefore, lacking sufficient unclassified data, we must assume planning was conducted while underway to the area of operation by the SOF forces on the U.S. Navy Ships. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and

⁵⁰ "Four American Hostages Killed by Somali Pirates," *NBC News, Reuters and The Associated Press*, February 22, 2011. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41715530/ns/world_news-africa/t/four-american-hostages-killed-somali-pirates/#.VmFj0IREjUF

the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for how to deal in a hostage rescue operation should already exist for the U.S. Navy ships and operators. Three U.S. Navy Ships the USS *Enterprise*, USS *Leyte Gulf*, USS *Sterett*, and USS *Bulkeley* were assigned the mission to free the hostages.

c. Phase II – Approach and Assault

American forces arrived on February 21, three days after the hijacking. On February 22, during the negotiation process between the pirates and U.S. Navy personnel regarding the release terms of the hostages, the pirates attempted to fire a rocket-propelled grenade at the USS *Sterett*. This act was followed by gunfire aboard the yacht. A boarding party dispatched to the yacht became involved in a brief skirmish with the pirates. The skirmish resulted in two pirates killed by gunshots and knife wounds while thirteen others surrendered. Unfortunately, the gun battle also wounded the hostages severely, and attempts to provide medical treatment were unsuccessful.

Apparently, the shooting of the rocket-propelled grenade at the USS *Sterett* was an indication of the rising tensions among the pirates, and such tensions might be triggered by internal or external causes. One possible set of internal causes may have been friction among the pirates and the efforts of the yacht's owner to fight back. The fact that there were two dead pirates in addition to those that were killed by the boarding party might be evidence of the friction that took place among the pirates.⁵¹ The possibility that the yacht's owner tried to fight back might be accountable, yet, considering the ratio of 4 hostages to 19 pirates, that possibility is suspect. One external cause might have been the U.S. task force that was shadowing the yacht. The close proximity of the ships may have caused a panic among pirates and further could have provoked them to act recklessly toward the task force. The close quarters of the yacht left insufficient space for the pirates and hostages to move freely and may have quickly become an internal cause beyond the control of the task force. This condition may have caused discomfort and anxiety among those pirates capable of initiating a hasty act. On

⁵¹ "4 Americans on Hijacked Yacht Dead off Somalia," *CBS News*, February 22, 2011. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/4-americans-on-hijacked-yacht-dead-off-somalia/>

the other hand, the USS *Sterett* should have avoided the movement and closing distance that caused the pirates to feel nervous and threatened.

d. Phase III – Post-assault

At the end of the operation, the U.S. forces managed to capture three of the pirates and sent them to the U.S. to face trial. Although the boarding party suffered no casualties and all the hijackers were killed or captured, the fact remains that, with the deaths of the hostages, the operation failed. Moreover, there were possible ramifications from other pirates, who became determined to hijack other American ships to avenge the deaths of their colleagues.

2. Examined Special Operation aspects

In the following paragraph, we analyze the above operation in light of the eight principles previously articulated. We will discuss that how adherence and/or violation of these principles contributed to the success or failure of the operation.

The relatively brief contact with the pirates, which ended in the deaths of the hostages, is difficult to analyze. In accordance with Gazit's goals of a hostage operation,⁵² the rescue operation was unsuccessful in that it failed to save the lives of the hostages. Some information and details of the rescue operation remain unavailable to the public. Therefore, the operational analysis of this incident is based on assumptions made by the authors and backed up by the standardization of rescue operations based on the Joint Publication 3-68 on Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).⁵³

a. Intelligence

In terms of operational intelligence, in conjunction with human assets American technical assets enhance the intelligence picture. In this case, the rescue force did not seem to have any problem gaining the advantage due to the fact that the U.S. forces

⁵² Shlomo Gazit, "Risk, Glory, and Rescue Operation in the International Security," *International Security* 6, no. 1 (Summer 1981): 112, doi: 10.2307/2538532.

⁵³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* (JP 3-68) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

already knew the location of the hijacked yacht and the number of pirates involved. Presumably they did so with the assistance of UAV and satellite imagery.

b. Simplicity

On the matter of simplicity, the complete rescue force comprised the personnel from the U.S. Navy. The deployment of a single branch in a rescue effort simplifies the chain of command and related elements during a mission. However, even though such a U.S. rescue force achieved the simplicity in terms of force structure, the mission still failed. This may have been due to the reality that the force which contacted the pirates immediately became involved in both negotiations and exchanging fire.

c. Purpose

The purpose of the mission seems clear to outside observers: to rescue the four American citizens held hostage by the pirates. However, because the mission failed during the rescue attempt we cannot say with certainty (lacking information from the actual actors) that all members of the rescue team were focused on this mission.

d. Repetition

The contact force was ordered to move quickly, thus no time was available to the rescue team to conduct tactical rehearsals. As the account of the event reveals, miscoordination between various elements might have been the reason for confusion, which resulted in mission failure. This shows that the importance of conducting rehearsals and repetition is vital for conducting rescue operations; however a perceived lack of time may often prevent adequate practice.

e. Security

The pirates did not have the technology or human resources to get the information about the U.S. plan, or to detect the movement of the assault force; therefore, no unusual arrangements for security were considered necessary during planning phase or during approach. Because the team was already in negotiation with the pirates, further concealing of the force was not deemed necessary. However, no account is available

about the contingency plan by the rescue force in the case negotiation failed, and whether that information was secured not.

f. Surprise

Surprise is mostly linked with initiative. An opportune moment has to be seized by taking the initiative to gain surprise. In this case, the upper hand of initiative was held by the pirates, who acted upon it by opening up the gun battle, thus no real surprise could be achieved by the rescue force. However, the rescue force may have tried to achieve surprise by first killing two exposed pirates on the boat, but the overall effort remained unsuccessful and resulted into the death of the hostages, even though 13 pirates were captured.

g. Speed

It took approximately three days for the task force to reach the known position of the hijacked yacht. In comparison, the previous U.S. task force took only one day to reach the target position of the MV *Maersk Alabama*. Despite the different nature of the case, speed remains a fundamental determinant for a rescue operation's success. McRaven mentions that speed itself could ensure the offensive force gains relative superiority. Any delay in getting to the "objective may expand the area of vulnerability and decrease the opportunity of achieving relative superiority."⁵⁴ However, because the pirates were probably aware of the *Maersk* outcome, no element of speed might have been fast enough.

h. Deception

With regard to deception, there is no available information that the task force developed a deception plan. However, from the account of the *Maersk* it can be assumed that there might have been some deception plan being considered as the result of an SOP. It is believed by the authors that the negotiations were themselves a deception designed to

⁵⁴ William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operation Warfare: Theory & Practice*, (New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 1996), 19.

buy time, keep the pirates busy, and divert their attention from any rescue effort. Clearly it failed.

Based on the NEO field manual, all the structures and organizational arrangements in an evacuation operation most likely had been organized properly. However, given the unpredictable, dynamic changes in the field there is no assurance that a previously well-managed plan will proceed accordingly once the human element comes into play. One lesson learned from this particular case is that an NEO should always be ready to encounter the worst-case scenario on the ground. Sometimes, even the best-prepared operations can go wrong simply because the nature of the operation itself is highly volatile.

Based on the operation failure, the three phases, and the principles of special operations, from the planning through the post assault phase, do not seem to have been applied effectively to this hostage rescue. Again, the major weakness of this case was a lack of good data. The authors recognize much of the narrative and analysis above is based on logical conjecture.

C. OPERATION RED AND WHITE

1. Chronology of the Story

a. Background

Operation “Red and White” was initiated as the operational response of the Indonesian government to the act of piracy by Somali pirates toward an Indonesian flagged ship, the MV *Sinar Kudus* having sailed from Kolaka, Indonesia with the port of destination of Rotterdam, the ship carried ferronickel in her hull. It was hijacked by Somali Pirates in the Gulf of Aden, near the Horn of Africa on 16th March 2011. The hijacked vessel was taken to the coastline of Eyl, Somalia. The Indonesian government responded by sending two frigates, along with a joint operation task forces from three branches containing Indonesian Special Forces personnel from the army, navy, and air force. Fundamentally, civil authority called for the deployment, while recognizing that the operation affected agreements in international relations (politics) and called into question the government’s capacity to safeguard Indonesian citizens abroad. In addition,

the deployed force itself had to travel a long distance to an extra-territorial region outside of the Indonesian territory. This fact made the governmental decision more complex and risky. The military responded by preparing an option to free the ship along with its hostage crew. The plan was then reported to the president for his decision. Public pressure had driven the government to fulfill the demand of the people, especially the relatives of the hostages, for a rescue mission of the MV *Sinar Kudus*. Three alternatives were considered for conducting the operation. The first involved the deployment of the Special Forces to the nearest multi-national alliance base (in Djibouti or Oman) and then moving toward the target area with multi-national ships. The second involved deploying Indonesian warships that included Special Forces personnel in the deployment. The third involved conducting an infiltration to the target area with a rubber boat (the “rubber duck” operation) and then subsequently infiltrating the pirate’s territory to save the hostages and release the ship from captivity. The complication of using multi-national assets in the target area and the risk of direct infiltration without sufficient support during the withdrawal phase for the third option discounted both the first and third options. The second option emerged as the most viable one for conducting the rescue mission.⁵⁵

b. Phase I – Planning

The task force began preparing for the mission by conducting the planning and rehearsal, while waiting for the execution order from the President. The planning process involved the commander in chief of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and the Air Force, along with the strategic commanders within the armed forces. The Marine Corps commander was then designated as the commander of the task force. The planning process and the rehearsal took place on an operational base for approximately one week. The rescue mission was prepared relatively hastily, considering the differences among the personnel in term of working ethic and culture, organizational structure, tactical and technical specialties, and chain of command. The familiarization among involved units was conducted in very brief time period. However, the military

⁵⁵ Emir Saufat, *Satgas Merah Putih: Memburu Perompak Somalia [Red and White Task Force: Hunting Somalia Pirates]*, (Jakarta: Indonesian Marine Corps, 2012), 37.

decision makers considered the time sufficient for the units to work together on a challenging mission to rescue hostages in foreign territory.⁵⁶

Eventually, after so many considerations, the operation Red and White, named after the national flag of the Republic of Indonesia, was executed, on the order of the president. The operation involved approximately 488 personnel from three branches. The military operation was complemented by diplomacy and negotiations between the owner of the ship and the pirates' group in Somalia.⁵⁷

c. Phase II – Approach and Assault

The rescue operation was coordinated on board the steaming ship moving toward the mission area. The final decision to deploy would rest with the President of Indonesia. However, the negotiation between the owner of the ship and the pirates also had a deteriorating curve, since a faction of the pirates did not agree with the ransom amount offered by the owner. Apparently, from the intelligence report over the multi-national asset on the ground in the vicinity of the coastline, there were many ships in the same area in addition to the MV Sinar Kudus. There were several others ships of differing sizes and types being held by the pirates waiting for ransoms. Pirates with weapons guarded each of these ships. With this intelligence, the task force decided to make its approach while considering several options for operational conduct.⁵⁸

d. Phase III – Post Assault

The operation ended when the owner of the ship agreed to pay the ransom requested by the pirates. The negotiation went through a third party mediator between the owner and the pirates. Nevertheless, the operation then changed into a salvage operation when the task force was directed to secure the extraction of the MV *Sinar Kudus* and avoid the possibility that the ship was being targeted by another group of pirates. Yet, the extraction did not go as planned. Apparently, there were other pirate groups trying to take

⁵⁶ Ibid., 39.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 72.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 106.

over the ship once the ransom was paid. The commander of the task force then deployed a small group of Special Forces to protect and cover the ship from an attempt to retake it. Eventually, the ship was recovered, and the task force along with the ship returned to safe haven in Salalah, Oman for replenishment and preparation to return to Indonesia.⁵⁹

2. Examined Special Operation Aspects

In the following paragraph, we analyze the above operation in light of the eight principles previously articulated. We will discuss that how adherence and/or violation of these principles contributed to the success or failure of the operation.

There are aspects of this case that can be examined in accordance with the theory and principles of special operations discussed in the previous chapter. First of all, the purposes of a special operation are fulfilled, according to Gazit⁶⁰ in that all the hostages were rescued; there were limited collateral damages and casualties; the casualties were inflicted solely upon the perpetrators or terrorists; and, there were no further ramifications in either the political or military arenas. However, from a tactical aspect, there are many things can be scrutinized in order to develop the guidance for a future rescue operation, given that there is high probability a similar situation could take place.

a. Intelligence

In terms of operational intelligence, certainly, intelligence comes from many sources who are not assets of a task force, yet it also comes from friendly assets who are operating in the target area. In this case, although the information was reliable, it would have been better to have had a friendly source from Indonesia's own assets for more discreet operation security. Meanwhile, the operators' skill can only be measured after the mission had been accomplished and the results came out. In this case, the result was rather inconclusive due to the negotiation, and paying the ransom took the place of the military operation

⁵⁹ Ibid., 126.

⁶⁰ Shlomo Gazit, "Risk, Glory, and Rescue Operation in the International Security," *International Security* 6, no. 1 (Summer 1981): 112, doi: 10.2307/2538532.

b. Simplicity

The simplicity of the mission itself cannot be underlined, since the simple goal of the mission to rescue the hostages had widened with the involvement of the three Special Forces branches, each with the differing characteristics, along with the use of warship assets in the operation. It is interesting to speculate what the result of the joint operation of the Special Forces three branches' would have been. This complexity somewhat undermined the simplicity of the operation. The three Special Forces branches operating together would be hindered by the different operational and tactical cultures each possessed. Simplicity can be achieved through operators familiar with one doctrine or set of procedures for a tactical deployment. The preparation of the task force with the combined rehearsals and practices was deemed insufficient for a mutual understanding of the operation at the tactical level. However, the result of the rehearsals was not put to the real test, due to the anti-climactic resolution of the crisis.

There were several incongruences in the Red and White operation, including the arrangement for the operation. Although it was intended to occur on the high seas and in the territory of another country, the logistical preparation was not well formulated, and this lack of preparation forced the task force to take a longer route, which consumed time that should be used to derive a relative superiority over the pirates. Additionally, the tasked forces were unprepared for the relatively new threat taking place outside the national territory. Moreover, the inclusion of a formal risk assessment and risk management protocol during the operation did not seem to be a focus during the task force deployment. There will always be a risk in a NEO operation. However, the risk assessment should be made properly to enable the force to accomplish the mission, yet at the same time, minimize the risk impacted to one's own force or a friendly force. A proper risk assessment involves identifying possible hazards, assessing possible hazards, developing the control ability, implementing the control and plausible action to act on it, and supervising the assessment and evaluating it once the mission is finished.⁶¹

⁶¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* (JP 3-68) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), G-1.

c. Purpose

In addition, from the beginning there was confusion over the purpose of the whole operation, including whether it would be a military rescue operation that would include diplomacy, or if it was primarily a diplomatic situation with the possibility of a military response. In any rescue operation it is essential that the executive stand on principle that the government will or will not negotiate with pirates. The confusion of the purpose might compromise the planned rescue mission assigned to a military task force. In this case, there were significant risks in deploying a military rescue operation in the effort to rescue both the hostages and MV Sinar Kudus.

d. Repetition

The rehearsal preparation that took place a week prior to the departure and the additional rehearsals onboard the warship were relatively insufficient to prepare the task force. The complexity of the operation with the aspects mentioned earlier demanded that the task force be highly dependent on each member of the team. However, the task force itself never entered the phase of field test on the results of their rehearsal. Therefore, the repetition and pattern of the task force members was not fulfilled satisfactorily.

e. Security

Regarding the special operations principle of security, there were no significant aspects of operation information that could have been compromised and provided an advantage to an adversary, in this case the pirates. The pirates lacked the technology to gather intelligence information from their own forces on the rescue operation. This lack of awareness should have been an advantage for the rescue operation and could have been used to further the element of surprise since the adversary would not know when and from which direction the rescue task force would come. Moreover, the tactical advantage was overwhelmingly on the task force's side considering that trained personnel with tactical equipment prepared for critical situations such as this.

f. Surprise

As mentioned above, the task force possessed the element of surprise, yet this aspect was never used. The decision to move forward with the insertion was dependent upon the negotiation between the shipping company and the pirates through a third party. The time frame was reduced very quickly while the force waited for the negotiation to be settled, thus reducing the element of surprise. In McRaven's words, the opportunity to achieve relative superiority had decreased very quickly.

g. Speed

Initially in this operation, the progress of the operation was slow as the deployment waited for an executive decision. Both the extensive logistics involved in the decision to deploy a relatively large number of Special Forces and the prolonged planning process, consumed time, and reduced the speed of the deployment. Furthermore, despite the great distance to the target, the operation required a rapid deployment in order to retain both the element of surprise and a tactical advantage. However, the planning process apparently did not consider speed and time as important factors in a rescue operation. Yet, in many operations, speed is a decisive factor that determines the end result.

h. Deception

Furthermore, this operation did not have any deception plan in place to be used against the adversary. This might have happened due to the lack of intelligence on the pirates and their intended movements with the target asset of the MV *Sinar Kudus*. It is clear that within the planning process, the task force should have had a deception plan inserted for the initial approach. However, the deployment of this particular plan would be under the disposal of the commander of the task force. Yet, the task force did not plan any deception towards the adversary since confusion existed between the negotiation plan and military plan.

During the planning phase, the special operations principles of simplicity, security, and repetition were expected. However, an analysis of the simplicity principle

does not seem to apply since the plan expanded multiple times with the inter-services joint operation. Yet, the principles of security and repetition still appear applicable given the operational security protocol and also the tactical and assault rehearsals that were conducted pre-departure of the task force. In phase II, the approach and assault phase does not seem to reflect the elements of surprise and speed, let alone the element of deception. The approach plan took time, giving the advantage of relative superiority to the pirates who were able to drag the ship further into their territory. Furthermore, the paid ransom did not allow the task force to launch an assault. The operators' skills were slightly used when the released ship was targeted by another group of pirates. The task force launched an attack on the inbound pirate's ship in order to defend the ship. In phase III, no applicable principles can be found in the post-assault process.

D. SUMMARY

From these three cases, the eight principles of intelligence, simplicity, purpose, repetition, security, speed, surprise, and deception appear fundamental in gaining the optimum result of a rescue operation. The capability to fulfill these aspects might expand the possibility for a successful operation aimed at achieving the goals prescribed by Gazit.⁶² Table 1 explains that during all the three cases studies, which principles were applied and which were either ignored or violated.

⁶² Shlomo Gazit, *Risk, Glory, and Rescue Operation, in the International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 112.

Table 1. Relation of the Principles in the Case Studies

Principles	Case Study I		Case Study II		Case Study III	
	MV Maersk Alabama		MV Sinar Kudus		SY Quest Yacht	
	Applied	Not Applied	Applied	Not Applied	Applied	Not Applied
I. Planning Phase						
Intelligence	√		√		√	
Simplicity	√		√		√	
Purpose	√		√			√
Repetition	√		√			√
Security	√		√			√
II. Approach & Assault Phase						
Intelligence	√		√		√	
Security	√		√			√
Surprise	√		√			√
Speed	√		√			√
Deception	√		√			√
III. Post Assault Phase						
Surprise	√		√			√
Speed	√		√			√
Deception	√		√			√
Outcome	Success		Negotiation/ Safeguarding		Failure	

Looking at the cases described above, among the eight principles of special operations, the aspects of simplicity and speed apparently contribute significantly to the successful of a rescue operation at sea. A simple speedy plan can cover up the weakness of a lack of repetition, as was the case in Red and White operation and MV *Maersk Alabama*. The same time can be utilized in rapid deployment of the force to achieve speed and surprise. Rescue operations are similar in nature to a special operation. Therefore, the speed of deployment and response is essential to gaining superiority over the enemy. Thus, speed should be the focus in developing any rescue operation. Any task force that is able to move in a timely manner in reaching its objectives should have the advantage, and it is clear that time is the decisive factor of most operations. During the planning phase, the presence of simplicity, security, repetition, and purpose are fundamental. On the approach phase, the elements of security, surprise, speed, operator's skills, and deception are crucial role to the success of the mission. While during the post-assault phase, many of the eight principles may not be applicable, with the exceptions of security and simplicity during the extraction process to safe haven for the hostages.

IV. THE CONCEPT FOR INDONESIAN NEO

The distinct environment of a rescue operation incorporates the nature of special operations, in that a rescue operation requires a special employment, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Therefore, the Indonesian government through its security forces, in particular its special forces, needs to take special measures in order to cope with unique threats by handling them with special-prepared forces to meet the nature and challenges posed by such threats. In this thesis, the authors specifically discuss the piracy threats in overseas territory. This section elaborates the roles of each institution from the strategic level to the tactical level and explains the role of each team during the deployment of a hostage rescue operation.

At the strategic level, the government, in this case the department of defense (*Kementerian Pertahanan*), which supervised the Indonesian Armed Forces, should be in close coordination with the department of foreign affairs (*Kementerian Luar Negeri*) in order to assess the situation in the area of the mission involving the host nation, since that nation's sovereignty will be compromised with the deployment of the mission. Whether the mission will penetrate deep into the host nation's inland territory, or operate in the host nation's water territory, the coordination between the department of foreign affairs and the host nation, through the diplomatic envoy of the designated ambassador in the respective nation, should be established as soon as possible, as time is critical to gain the relative superiority over the perpetrators of the existing crisis. In such critical cases involving the US, the U.S. government will establish a Washington Liaison Group (WLG) "that is responsible for coordination and implementation at the national level of all emergency and evacuation operations plans by DOS and DOD and by other USG agencies as appropriate."⁶³ In the WLG "the Secretary of Defense shall advise and assist the Secretary of State and the heads of other federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, in planning for the protection, evacuation, and repatriation of U.S. citizens in

⁶³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* (JP 3-68) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), II-1.

overseas areas.”⁶⁴ As for the implementation in Indonesia, the ministry of defense shall act as the leading institution for all preparation encompassing the required institutions for the rescue operation. The Foreign Affairs Ministry shall consult with the host nation on diplomatic issues regarding the crisis within their territory involving Indonesian citizens. The government will form a temporary (ad-hoc) agency to accommodate the coordination and communication needed to prepare the operation deployment similar to the WLG. This ad-hoc agency shall be responsible for these issues:

1. Offer recommendations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in establishing a group that would liaise the interest of the Indonesian government to the respective nations that may be involved during the deployment of the rescue operation. These nations may be involved in providing logistic or political support.
2. Provide advice to the liaison agency, the diplomatic and consular posts, and military commands involved in the rescue operation.
3. Monitor all activities from all institution within the operation frame.
4. Coordinate every step of the operation preparation with the ministry of defense and foreign affairs in relation to the rapidly changing environment.

This ad-hoc agency shall consist of the representative of all respective ministries and institutions, including military personnel, so that as the field operator updates any incoming new information, that information is broadcast to all elements of the operation.

Within the Defense Ministry, the minister is the designated official to report to the president. Moreover, the minister shall be coordinate all subordinates in the scope of the ministry from the Commander in chief of the Indonesian national armed forces, and the chief of staff of each service, to the combatant commander in the field. The minister shall supervise the preparation of the lower unit in order to align the preparation with the policy of the government, especially during rapid changes in the strategic environment.

Coordination shall also be established with representatives of the host nation through diplomacy conducted by the ministry of foreign affairs. The accordance of the host nation is critical, since a mission within the area of operation may be considered a

⁶⁴ Ibid.

violation of sovereignty if conducted without proper permission of the host nation. Moreover, the involvement of a non-governmental organization (NGO) in the operation may be necessary, particularly if the NGO provides humanitarian assistance in the case of an evacuation of large number of individuals.

In the case of a U.S. operation, the ambassador of the respective region holds the highest coordination responsibility on the ground. However, in the case of Indonesia, the possibility of an ambassador holding the responsibility of a military operation is still highly unlikely. Therefore, the combatant commander would be the one responsible for overall implementation of an operational deployment. Looking at the case of the Red and White operation, the combatant commander onboard the deployed ship was the commander of the task force. In terms of organizational structure, the combatant commander, under the supervision of the minister of defense reports directly to the president, who holds the highest authority in making the operational decision while considering the changing situation in the strategic and tactical environment. The organization would form an advance headquarters, main body, and the evacuation force. The HQ would consist of the combatant commander and the diplomatic official designated to the mission. Together they would provide updated information on the mission and also the current condition of the overall environment. The main body would consist of the principal offensive force inserting into the target area and conducting the rescue. An evacuation force would be necessary if the evacuees are required to be picked up by other means of transportation than those employed by the insertion team. The necessity to establish a NEO coordination center depends upon the magnitude and the duration of the operation. The purpose of the center is to provide a central information exchange between institutions and, perhaps, other nations involved within the mission.

The execution of an NEO may be conducted in three phases⁶⁵:

1. Planning phase. The activities like collecting of information about target and enemy, and conducting of rehearsal as per plan are carried out more so logistical aspects are also look into to support the mission.

⁶⁵Ibid., II-14.

2. Approach and assault. This phase involves move to the target area and execution of the mission. After the hostages are rescued, provision of necessary life saving medical first aid treatment.
3. Post assault. The purpose of the whole NEO mission is to evacuate safely all of the evacuees to a prior-designated safe haven and withdraw all forces safely.

It is important to remember that there may be many activities overlapping during various phases of the operation. That determination lies within the authority of the head of the mission, or the commander of the task force, or whomever may apply to the situation.

Regarding logistic support, Indonesia rarely has an infrastructure in foreign countries that could support the entire operation. Therefore, the task force should be able to provide a short-notice logistic system that would guarantee sustainable support for the operation. If sufficient time exists, a negotiated Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) can be arranged with the host nation. However, in a case where time is pressing, the task force could initiate an in-country resources arrangement through a private contractor to provide the support.

The goal of the rescue operation should be measured according to Gazit's⁶⁶ purposes that comprise of:

1. The hostages can be rescued alive and well.
2. The end result of the operation is conducted with no, or minimum, collateral damages or casualties.
3. If there should be casualties, they should be limited to the perpetrators or terrorists.
4. There are no further political or military manner ramifications that could affect wider aspects than the hostage rescue operation.

⁶⁶ Shlomo Gazit, "Risk, Glory, and Rescue Operation in the International Security," *International Security* 6, no. 1 (Summer 1981): 112, doi: 10.2307/2538532.

In addition to these goals, the rescue operation should fulfill the special operation principles⁶⁷ that consist of:

1. Intelligence. It involves use of all intelligence collecting sources to collect information about the target area, enemy, conditions and roots, and each collation and interpretation to assist and familiarization of some plan. The intelligence sources should also keep the commander and the forces on ground updated about any changes occurring all the above aspects.
2. Simplicity. An operation plan should be made as simple as possible to assure full comprehension of the plan.
3. Security. The security of the operation should be foremost, in order to retain the element of surprise and guarantee the secrecy of the mission.
4. Repetition. The conducting of rehearsals and training is one factor in assuring the operation proceeds in accordance to the initial plan. In order to accomplish the purpose of a mission, the operators need to be skillful and able to conduct the mission. The capability of the force is fundamental to successfully completing the mission.
5. Surprise. This critical factor contributes to the success of the mission and facilitates relative superiority over the adversary.
6. Speed. This factor is the essential in order to gain relative superiority over the adversary. Therefore, a rapid deployment is required. However, a rapid deployment is only possible when all hardware and software are in place and ready to run.
7. Purpose. The factor ultimately underscores the reason for the overall operation.
8. Deception. The necessity to use deception is authorized by the task force commander. Nevertheless, deception is required to assure the element of surprise, the biggest advantage for the mission.

These purposes and principles should be heavily considered by the mission planner and the decision maker on the field in order to gain relative superiority over the adversary. Furthermore, it is quite apparent that speed and rapid deployment are essential to achieving relative superiority during the mission. In order to have a rapid deployment, the government should have a systematic deployment that ensures all protocols and

⁶⁷ William H. McRaven, "The Theory of Special Operations" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993); Carlos M. Perez, "Anatomy of a Hostage Rescue: What Makes Hostage Rescue Operations Successful?" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014).

procedures can be fulfilled accordingly. That system should include the existence of doctrine, guidelines, and a manual of operational conduct.

All of the above aspects should be included in the development of an Indonesian evacuation and rescue operation, especially for those at sea. With a clear guidelines and a manual to follow, the deployment of a rescue operation is simpler for each institution participating in the mission with a corresponding greater chance of mission success.

V. IMPLICATIONS

This thesis is intended to serve as a guide in the development of new doctrines and guidance for the Indonesian government, especially for the Indonesian task forces assigned overseas missions to rescue hostages. Based on the experience in deploying the Red and White operation off the Somalian coastlines, there are many aspects of the operation that require improvement and amelioration of conduct, especially in the coordination between the government and its international partners in assuring the flow of information and sustainable logistic support. Internally, the inter-services coordination among the Special Forces is essential for better joint operations in the future. Despite the type of the operation, inter-service Special Forces cooperation should be on the priority list of the Indonesian armed forces in order to improve its joint special operation deployment capability.


With clear guidelines and a manual, the Indonesian government can define a purpose for the force to follow that would align with the foreign policy of the government. Moreover, a manual can provide steps and phases to be followed by the operator in coordination with the line of bureaucracy. Additionally, a set of well-developed guidelines and a manual provide a mission framework, from the initial phase of operation planning, to the approach and assault, to the end phase of post assault.

For that reason, the government, in this case the armed forces, should focus on improving the NEOs conducted by the Indonesian Special Forces. For example, the operation may be conducted by a single service in spite of a joint operation. The decision would depend on the magnitude of the operation and the capability needed to accomplish the mission. In viewing the conduct of a rescue operation among other operations, the government should divide it into two types of policy considerations.

A. INTERNAL POLICY

Respective authorities have to decide the best option to minimize the expenses and post effect risks. See the conceptual framework in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework Diagram.



The figure above uses the case of *MV Sinar Kudus* as an example to describe the internal policy the government might develop in making the call for similar operations in the future. It is essential to give the highest assurance to the people that the government will do anything in its power to protect Indonesian citizens from any threat overseas, in particular the risk of piracy along the maritime trade routes. It is highly related to the national interest since the government is developing a maritime concept that will rely on the maritime economy to boost the national economy. This assurance can contribute to the positive build-up of an Indonesian maritime economy. Moreover, the Indonesian government should be able to act upon it with the ability to respond appropriately to an

emerging threat. It is important to create a deterrent effect to the possibility of future threats. The ability to conduct such operations may increase the government's credibility throughout the country. The Indonesian government should establish a national mechanism to detect, access, analyse and decide the proper measures to cope and to counter the emerging threats. This mechanism, which would be identified in a formal guidance or manual, must involve all stakeholders in the decision-making process in the context of contingency action. There should be standard procedures. It is important, through the government's legitimate security forces, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), build relevant plans, especially in force structure development, to anticipate any possible threat scenario to Indonesia citizen anywhere in the world. This process should include a command and control system that could accommodate an inter-services joint operation in addition to a single service deployment. The comprehension of the mission should be recognized at a multi-national level so that similar ROEs may ease the understanding among the services or forces involved. For this reason, the making of common guidelines and manual is prerequisite for a mutual joint operation.

The Indonesian National Armed Forces' (TNI) capabilities depend highly on the provided resources, national economic strength, intelligent resources, personnel skill, and geographical, and tactical environments in order to overcome future threats despite the location. In line with those matters, the Indonesian government must have strategic guidance. This guidance should seriously consider the limited resources available for the mission. In the long run, the presence of such guidance and a manual would be an investment by the government in economically using its resources effectively and efficiently.

B. EXTERNAL POLICY

The Indonesian government, in accordance with international law, has to diplomatically coordinate with the host nation, the United Nation, maritime communities, and the international naval forces conducting law enforcement in the region of an act of piracy involving Indonesian citizens. The importance of this coordination is to assure the effort of the mission can be maintained with the support of the host nation and also allies.

The assurance of support is important in sustaining the mission and increasing the opportunity for a successful mission. In addition to the inter-governmental coordination, the cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is also crucial in increasing scale of the operation since the government may not be able to handle all humanitarian assistance required.

The media also plays an important role in broadcasting the situation and conditions on the field. Therefore, a good publication should be one that focuses on other elements of the mission besides the technical aspect of the operation. A well-coordinated publication should be able to boost the morale of the forces and also the relatives of the hostages. Besides that, a deception plan and psy-ops may be launched through the media as a means of shaping perception through information directed towards the adversary.

The government and the task force could cultivate a great advantage when they accumulate the benefits of an external policy that provides additional support and assistance to the success of the mission. Moreover, the ability to gather support is evidence of national credibility in the eyes of other countries. The existence of a well-planned operation that is derived from a perfect conceptual guidance and a manual would add value to the operation and boost national credibility, perhaps even to the point of deterring future hostage-taking.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. RESCUE OPERATIONS

The emergence of new seaborne threats in the maritime domain, such as piracy on the high seas, has posed new challenges for any government whose economy relies on maritime trade. These threats are disrupting the world economy, in particular those countries whose economies depend highly on the sea lanes of trades (SLOTs) as the primary veins to sustain their economy. It is highly logical to conclude that the increasing number of seaborne threats is due to the corresponding increase in the complexity of maritime economy. The rate of occurrence of these seaborne threats also increases the possibility of abductions or hijacking that could end in the demand of ransom. Somali pirates, in particular, pose threats for any maritime shipping that passes in the vicinity of Somalia's water territory. This threat has exposed a new challenge to national nations, and it is necessary for every nation to be prepared with a scenario that involves its citizen in a plot of abduction or hijacking. The effort to release the hostages without further collateral damage is known as a military operation other than war (MOOTW). For some advanced countries, the development of this type of military operation has reached the point of sustainment of operation, since the fundamentals of the operation have been sufficiently established. For Indonesia the development is a work in progress.

The discussion of the previous three cases of hijacking has provided tests of eight fundamental principles, derived from both McRaven, and Perez, that indicate a rescue operation is a sophisticated and complex mission that requires well-prepared planning, execution, and withdrawal phases. The complexity of the operation is even greater when the mission area is outside the sovereignty of one country and would involve either friendly forces or the support from other governments to assure the accomplishment of the operation. The analyses of these cases are fundamentally focused on the operational and tactical levels. However, the overall rescue operation involves all levels of administration and security forces in order to make sure the support for the operation can be covered in all aspects.

Most importantly, the concept of a complex rescue operation should be comprehended by all decision makers, planners, and field operators in order to enact a well-planned operation with a common understanding of unity in action and purpose. For this reason, the concept should be made as simple as possible, yet still allow ample space for improvisation and development in accordance with the field dynamic and tactical or environment changes.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to implement the proposed ideas in this thesis, there are several recommendations that could be forwarded to the respective officials related to the improvement of guidance and development of a manual for special evacuation operations.

1. Create a specific set of guidelines and a manual in accordance with the requirements of the strategic environment, in particular for the NEO mission.
2. Take the purposes and the principles of special operations into consideration in formulating the guidelines and manual for a special evacuation operation.
3. Formulate internal and external policies that would support the deployment of an overseas NEO mission.
4. Improve the capabilities of joint services special operations through the means of doctrine and capability amelioration that could accommodate different capabilities and specialties.

The above recommendations will fulfil the preamble of the Indonesian 1945 Constitution that contains the phrase: “protect all the people and the entire country of Indonesia, promote the general welfare, the intellectual life of the nation, and participate in the establishment of world order based on freedom, lasting peace, and social justice.”

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